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ON THE ISSUES DIVIDING CONTEMPORARY 
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS 
James A. Keller 
Recently Gordon Kaufman published an article in Faith and Philosophy in 
which he gave some reasons why contemporary theologians are not much 
interested in the issue of evidentialism. Still more recently Eleonore Stump 
and Norman Kretzmann replied to it. In this paper I argue that their reply 
does not engage the issue which concerns the theologian. I try to define that 
issue and show what implications it has for the usefulness to Christian theologians 
of the work of Christian philosophers of religion. 
Recently in an article in Faith and Philosophy Gordon Kaufman gave some 
reasons why contemporary theologians are not much interested in the issue 
of evidentialism. 1 Still more recently Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann replied in the same journaI.2 I want to continue the discussion. 
The burden of my remarks will be that, contrary to Stump and Kretzmann, a 
variety of factors may well render theologians like Kaufman justified in 
having little interest in what philosophers like them are doing (though they 
also may be justified in what they are doing). 
Kaufman s Article 
Kaufman's article is set in the context of his observation that though there is 
considerable ferment in both contemporary Christian theology and contem-
porary philosophy of religion, the theologians and the philosophers engaged 
in each of these enterprises do not seem to be in much communication with 
each other. So Kaufman proposes to explain why he (and presumably some 
other theologians) do not have much interest in what is going on in contemporary 
philosophy of religion; he focuses on the current discussion of evidentialism as 
a particular issue much discussed by philosophers of religion and gives three 
reasons why theologians have little interest in it. I point out the broader context 
of his discussion because it will be important for my later comments. 
Kaufman begins with the claim that "evidentialist arguments are addressed 
to specific beliefs held by adherents of a particular religious tradition: does 
the evidence favor belief A or ... weigh against it?" (39). Even recent ques-
tionings of the rational appropriateness of the demand for evidence, he adds, 
also involve evidentialist arguments. Such arguments are internal to the tra-
dition in the sense that they assume that the claims, concepts, and terminology 
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of that tradition frame the crucial issues; the only matter to be decided is 
whether the claims are true or false. But "wider questions, about the nature 
of traditions or worIdviews themselves and how these function in human 
experience and thinking, do not ordinarily come up for direct consideration 
in these discussions" (39). But many theologians have become very con-
cerned with precisely these wider issues, so evidentialist arguments hold little 
interest for them. Kaufman states that there are many reasons for this shift 
in interest among theologians; he gives three. 
The first of these is an increased consciousness of the significance of 
religious pluralism. In the past most Christians have responded to other faiths 
by claiming that Christian beliefs are true and all others which contradict 
them are false. But now many theologians are appreciative of other religions 
(and of other traditions within Christianity) and believe that their own under-
standing of Christian faith and life may be illuminated by things learned from 
adherents of other traditions (both inside and outside Christianity). 
Closely related to this reason is the second: "the emergence of new theories 
about the ways in which cultural and linguistic symbolic or conceptual frames 
shape all our experiencing and thinking" (40). This, along with the new attitude 
toward pluralism has made theologians dubious about the status of truth-claims 
in religions. The function of religious language has come to be seen as not so 
much the making of truth-claims but the presenting of a framework within which 
meaning for human life can be found (41). So theologians have become con-
cerned with questions like how certain concepts originated, how they functioned 
in human life, and what the consequences were of employing them. One result 
is that theologians have become very tentative about all ways of conceptual-
izing the central realities in the Christian faith-e.g., God and Christ; Kauf-
man can even speak of a sort of agnosticism about these realities (44). Not 
surprisingly, they also doubt the traditional way(s) of conceiving these real-
ities. If this is the position of the theologians, they will have little interest in 
evidentialist arguments about some particular conception. 
The third reason is the confrontation with appalling evil in the twentieth 
century-e.g., world wars, the holocaust, the ecological crisis. Combined 
with this has been the conviction that Christian faith bears "some significant 
responsibility" for most of those evils. This has led theologians to inquire 
into what other traditions might have to offer and to look with new intensity 
at the ways "Christian symbols, practices and institutions have actually func-
tioned in human life" (42). 
Kaufman concludes by sketching what he believes to be the context within 
which many theologians approach questions having to do with primary reli-
gious symbols like God. They feel that at the base of all existence is a profound 
mystery about which their symbols speak, but they have no certainty of 
the aptness of the concepts used to conceptualize it or of the correctness 
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of any of the claims made about it, including traditional ones. Moreover, they 
believe that claims to certainty of knowledge suggest a sinful desire to control 
that mystery at the base of our humanity, the mystery Christians name God. 
Stump and Kretzmann s Reply 
Stump and Kretzmann present Kaufman's three reasons and respond to each. 
To his point about religious pluralism, they note that pluralism does not 
preclude the truth of certain religious claims, nor does belief in the truth of 
the doctrines of one's own religion necessarily lead to intolerance toward 
contradictory doctrines or to lack of sympathy toward those who believe 
them. They also point out that his agnosticism about God implies that he must 
deny religious claims made by non-Christian theists as well as those made 
by Christian theists, so his position also implies the falsity of the truth-claims 
of other religions. To his point about Christian responsibility for the evils of 
the world, they question whether Christians are in fact responsible. But more 
importantly, they claim that even if Christians were responsible, that would 
not show that Christian doctrines are not true, for many people act in ways 
which violate the precepts of their worldview. 
However, their main attention is focused on responding to Kaufman's point 
about relativism and to the agnosticism about God to which it leads. His 
cultural relativism is, they say, self-defeating. What is the status of the claim 
that all truth-claims are relative to a conceptual system? If that is relative to 
Kaufman's conceptual system, why should philosophers be concerned with it? 
If it is a non-relative claim, then non-relative truth-claims are possible. They also 
claim that Kaufman's practice is not consistent with his relativism. For exam-
ple, he makes claims about what is really evil (the holocaust, the ecological 
crisis); and he tells us things about God, such as that God is unknowable and 
that to "'try to make ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny' 
is to 'sin against God'" (336, citing 44). 
They conclude by suggesting that the most powerful of the motives which 
have led theologians to turn to preliminary questions about the role of 
worldviews and away from the traditional doctrines discussed by contempo-
rary philosophers of religion is "the theologians' growing suspicion that the 
traditional doctrines could not be taken seriously by intelligent, sophisticated, 
twentieth-century academics" (337). Implicit in this remark is the suggestion 
that the discussions by contemporary philosophers of religion show that this 
suspicion is unfounded. Therefore, Stump and Kretzmann invite the theolo-
gians to join them in these discussions. 
Disagreements about the Fundamental Issue and Their Implications 
Both Kaufman's article and Stump and Kretzmann's response are richer than 
my brief summaries convey, but I believe that I have at least outlined the 
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essence of the positions of each. In the space which remains I want to assess 
the reply and to defend a position like Kaufman's or at least to respond to 
Stump and Kretzmann in a way sympathetic to what I believe to be the 
theologian's concerns. Since my response involves some interpretive modi-
fications and additions to Kaufman's article, I would not want to claim that 
it is exactly his position, but I think it captures the spirit of what he was 
suggesting. At least it will convey my understanding of what he was driving 
at and of the context of contemporary theology which his article reflects. 
Thus, even if my additional comments do not represent his position, I hope 
that they will contribute to an understanding of the differences between con-
temporary theologians and contemporary philosophers of religion. 
First, a brief assessment. I think that Stump and Kretzmann's response is 
correct, given what they understand to be the issues. The fact of pluralism 
does not logically imply that no position is true, nor does the belief that one's 
position is true necessarily imply that one will be intolerant of those who 
hold other positions. Failure to live by a code does not show that the precepts 
of the code or its associated doctrines are false. To say that we can know nothing 
about God implies that we know at least one thing about God-viz., that God is 
a reality about which we can know nothing. As logical points these are unexcep-
tionable. If these are the issues, Stump and Kretzmann have rebutted Kaufman's 
reasons. And yet I cannot shake the feeling that they have not engaged the issues 
as Kaufman understands them. This is a rather bold claim on my part. Let me try 
to defend it by suggesting what I think their rebuttal overlooks. 
I suggest that theologians of today are greatly concerned not about truth 
and truth-claims, but about the effects in the lives of believers which are 
associated with adhering to various beliefs. 3 Religion, they might say, is 
primarily concerned not with giving us truths about God but with mediating 
our salvation. From this perspective, the truth of the beliefs is secondary to 
the effects which holding them have in the lives of believers, in the commu-
nity of believers, and in the larger world of which believers are a part. 
That this is Kaufman's position, or more generally that of many theologians 
today, is not as central in his article as I make it in my comments. But there 
are indications in Kaufman's article that he would agree, most notably his 
references to the theologian's concern for the way religious symbols actually 
function in the religious community (42) and for the consequences of their 
employment (36); his mention of alleged Christian responsibility for evils as 
one of the three reasons he discusses; and his claim that the function of 
religious language "has come to be seen not so much as the making of 
truth-claims but the presenting of a framework within which meaning for 
human life can be found" (41). However, I make this claim also on the basis 
of my own reading of contemporary theologians.4 
Assume for a minute that this is the theologian's underlying concern. Note its 
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implications for the points on which Stump and Kretzmann criticized Kauf-
man. First, consider their point that failure to live by a code does not show 
that the code or its associated doctrines are false. Of course not. But if those 
who profess a code and its doctrines often do not live by it and if others who do 
not profess the code often live in ways which its professors should, then one has 
to wonder whether professing the code has any point. If, for the sake of argument, 
Christianity does not motivate most of its adherents to resist great evils, then 
what does it matter if its doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation are true? 
Second, consider the point about religious pluralism. Of course, simply 
being convinced of the truth of one's position does not logically imply that 
one must be intolerant. But there has been much intolerance among and by 
Christians: the persecutions of Christians of different beliefs, the armed strug-
gles over religious differences during and after the Reformation, the tendency 
of many Christian groups to use the power of the state to support their own 
versions of Christianity, the persecutions of Jews, the doctrine widely held 
among certain Christians for centuries that falsehood has no right to exist. 
Perhaps these were all aberrations of Christianity, but one has to wonder why 
they were so numerous and deep-seated. Why was Christianity so slow to 
deal effectively with them? Was there something about Christian doctrine that 
blinded Christians to these aberrations (assuming that they were aberrations)? 
One might understand also why some theologians might conclude that in our 
time the best way to prevent such aberrations is to stress the mystery of God, 
how inadequate our conceptions of God's nature are, and how tentative and 
undogmatic must be our profession of them. 
Third, consider the point about agnosticism about God. To say that we can 
know nothing about God is equivalent to saying that God is a being about 
whom we can know nothing and thus does make a claim about God. But I 
think that what I take to be Kaufman's basic point on this matter can be made 
in a way which escapes that criticism. Rather than saying that we can know 
nothing about God, he might say that (at least under the present conditions of 
human existence) we can never show (or, perhaps, justifiedly claim to know) 
that our claims about God are true. This approach at least is not so obviously 
open to the charge of inconsistency. Some support for this proposal can be 
found in the way Kaufman puts his point about God's being the mystery 
which is the source and context of our humanity. He often puts it in the formal 
mode, not the material mode, saying "God is the name Christians give to this 
mystery," rather than saying "God is this mystery. "5 Kaufman's repeated mention 
of the issue of how we conceptualize God also is consistent with this proposal. 
Relativism, Cultural Conditioning, and Confessional Theology 
But this proposal does not resolve all the inconsistencies which arise in 
connection with his agnosticism about God and more generally with his 
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relativism, for he also says that doing certain things is a sin against God. 
Thus he implies that he knows enough about God to know that something is 
a sin against God. One possible response to this difficulty is to distinguish 
matters on which we are more justified in being confident from those on 
which we are less justified.6 To judge from other things Kaufman says in the 
article, he is far more confident in his judgments about what is evil than he 
is in his doctrines about the nature of God. I suggest that he might also say 
that he is justified in having these different degrees of confidence. Perhaps 
this difference is justified because it is far easier to determine that certain 
things are destructive of human beings and of the world they inhabit than it 
is to determine the nature of God (i.e., of the mystery which is the source 
and context of our humanity); the former realities are available for our ob-
servation and study while the latter is not.7 Moreover, the different conceptual 
systems people use seem to have far more influence over how they concep-
tualize "the mystery which lies at the base of their humanity" than it does 
over what things they consider to be destructive of human beings and other 
creatures. (To be sure, there are differences over what actions are overall evil, 
but these arise primarily because of differences over empirical claims-e.g., 
the Jews caused this or that situation in Germany or a certain practice does 
not threaten any long-range damage to the environment.) The theologian may 
also feel far more justified in his judgments about what sort of actions and 
attitudes are harmful to his relationship with the mystery at the ground of his 
being than he is about how to conceptualize that mystery, for the former 
judgment can be based on his experience of ruptures in that relationship while 
the latter is far less directly related to his experience. 
Re-expressing Kaufman's point in terms of degrees of justification for 
various beliefs enables us to understand why the theologian may feel little 
confidence in the correctness of even his own ways of conceptualizing God. 
When he reflects on the important role which conceptual schemes inherited 
from one's culture play in conceptualizing the ultimate, he may conclude that 
the task of showing the correctness anyone belief formulated in terms of any 
one conceptual scheme is so vast and difficult an undertaking that no one 
should feel much justified confidence about any formulation. Therefore, he 
might decide to focus his energies on matters on which it seems to him more 
likely that he can reach a correct judgment-or at least one about whose 
correctness he can feel more justified confidence. 
Of course, his own judgments about the nature of God are not based on 
nothing. In part they are based on his experience of that reality. But his 
experience far underdetermines what is claimed about the nature of God. Far 
more of what is said about the nature of God by theologians and by Christian 
philosophers is determined by the Christian tradition as they have received 
and understood it, by other factors in their cultures, and by their own reflec-
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tions. In the case of Stump and Kretzmann in particular, much of their work 
is a careful mining and refining of ways of understanding God which were 
current in the High Middle Ages. Other Christian philosophers work out of a 
Reformed or Episcopalian tradition. Because these traditions tended to accept 
such traditiomil doctrines as Nicene Trinitarianism and Chalcedonian Christology, 
such Christian philosophers may believe it worthwhile to try to explicate and 
show the internal consistency of the claims involved in these doctrines. 
But the theologians of whom Kaufman speaks may think this whole enter-
prise is of little value or interest, a point noted by Stump and Kretzmann in 
their conclusion and attributed to the theologian's suspicion that intellectually 
sophisticated believers can no longer take these doctrines seriously. However, 
I believe that this explanation is too narrow. I suspect that the problem is 
more of a general feeling that the traditional formulations are not what William 
James termed "live options." Theologians, like philosophers, have their rea-
sons, sometimes rational, sometimes simply causal, for finding something to 
be a live option or not to be one. I could illustrate this point with any of several 
traditional doctrines, but I shall use the Nicene Trinitarian formulation. This will 
allow me to illustrate also what I understand to be Kaufman's point about the 
conceptualities and worldviews in terms of which doctrines are formulated. 
The Nicene formulation employs a conceptuality of ousiai and hypostaseis, 
which was current in the fourth century; today's theologian may find this 
foreign to his own way of thinking about the world or even incomprehensible. 
He may find other ways of expressing his understanding of God and Christ 
more illuminating and helpful. Or the theologian may believe that the doctrine 
lacks Biblical support, or that it represents too great an extension into spec-
ulative categories for him to have much confidence in it. Or he may think 
that factors of imperial politics played too large a role in the outcome for us 
to have great confidence in the result. For any or all of these reasons, he may 
doubt that being a Christian requires this way of understanding God's pres-
ence in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. To be sure, he must acknowledge that 
the creed was accepted for centuries by most professing Christians, but he 
might point out that particularly in ages which lack the interest and tools of 
modem historiography, promulgated traditions would tend to be accepted, for 
no one would know how they came to be accepted, and contrary positions 
would tend not to be preserved; moreover, he might doubt that the acceptance 
of these traditions, as opposed to such Biblical formulations as that God was 
in Christ and God is present in the church by the Spirit, actually played a 
significant role in the lives of believers and of the church. For these and other 
reasons the theologian might not be interested in evidentialist arguments 
about the Nicene doctrines. Of course, all these reasons are controversial; I 
suggest them not as conclusive reasons against the Nicene doctrines but as 
possible motivations for not being interested in discussions aimed at refining 
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and/or supporting and/or disproving these doctrines. To be sure, if the doc-
trines were disproved, that might remove all but historical interest in them. 
But the theologian whom Kaufman represents may not even be interested in 
attempting a disproof, any more than most of us are interested in attempting a 
disproof of various Buddhist or Hindu doctrines. We all think our time is better 
spent elsewhere; moreover, we lack the expertise, and we are not interested in 
gaining it. As James pointed out, much of what we find to be live or dead 
options is not the result of careful prior consideration of those options. 
Indeed, we must find an option live before we give it careful consideration. 
My suggestions about theologians vis a vis Nicene Trinitarianism were 
intended to be illustrative of suggestions which might be made in relation to 
many traditional doctrines. I believe that analogous reasons give theologians 
like Kaufman motivation for doubts about most traditional doctrines. Such 
doubts would be enhanced if one compared doctrines about God's nature 
formulated at various times and found important ways in which they reflect 
the cultures of the formulators, thus supporting (though not proving) the 
generalization that this is always true. 8 If I am right about these alleged 
reasons and motivations, it is understandable why the theologian may very 
well regard the traditional doctrines about God which occur in evidentialist 
arguments as simply culturally conditioned formulations of beliefs by which 
some Christians express aspects of their faith. Presumably the Christian theologian 
will base his understanding of God on some elements in the Christian tradition 
and perhaps on other elements in his culture (as the church fathers did in the 
Nicene Creed), but the elements might not be the ones which have been 
important for many prior Christians. For the total Christian tradition is far 
richer than any particular formulations, and the theologian may find that other 
aspects of the tradition or other ways of conceptualizing God and Christ are 
more relevant or more adequate to his own Christian experience. And those 
will be the topics on which he works. (Philosophers do the same thing.) The 
theologian will almost certainly have some beliefs about such doctrinal mat-
ters as the nature of God and Christ, by which he expresses his faith. But the 
theologian might well regard them also as simply culturally conditioned 
formulations of beliefs by which he expresses his faith. Therefore, he may 
not have much interest in evidentialist arguments for or against even the 
doctrinal formulations he employs. He will be more interested in the effect 
which believing them has on the lives of Christians than he is in proving them; 
he may even think the latter task impossible or at least so difficult as not to be 
worth attempting, or he may not even think that correct and incorrect are appro-
priate terms of assessment for beliefs about God's nature. This way of practicing 
theology may be termed confessional rather than dogmatic, for the theologian is 
confessing the understanding by which he lives his life rather than trying to prove 
its truth or its superiority over all other conceptions.9 If he defended his beliefs 
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at all, he would do so by showing their roots in some part of the tradition 
(especially in the Bible) and their role in enabling him to live a Christian life. 
Conclusion 
Of course, the theologian may be wrong in his conviction that certain doc-
trines are only culturally conditioned formulations of beliefs and in the re-
lated beliefs I mentioned. But no one can explore every issue. Each of us 
must focus on some issues; our choice of issues will be based on many 
convictions which we have not examined but which we accept. They will also 
be based on factors which are biographical. Many Christian philosophers 
today are interested in evidentialist arguments about beliefs related to our 
faith. That we are interested in such arguments may have more to do with 
our personalities and profession than with our understanding our faith; phi-
losophers qua philosophers tend to be interested in arguments about matters 
of truth and meaning. Analogously, the contemporary theologian's interest in 
how concepts and beliefs arise and develop and in how they relate to life may 
have more to do with his personality and profession than with his understand-
ing of his faith; I have already claimed that theologians qua theologians today 
tend to be interested in how religious belief contributes to (and expresses) 
the transformation of one's life. 
This last point suggests that some differences between the issues which con-
cern contemporary Christian philosophers and those which concern contempo-
rary theologians may be the result of differences between the professions as well 
as the other sorts of differences we have considered. Theologians may be more 
interested in how beliefs affect people's lives and attitudes than they are in the 
accuracy of our understanding of the mystery at the ground of our being. Even 
if the Christian philosopher thinks that the theologian is interested in an important 
topic, she may claim that a more accurate understanding of that mystery will 
promote the desired transformation of lives and attitudes. The philosopher may also 
claim that her special expertise is dealing with concepts and with arguments about 
the matters in question; on this point I think the theologian must agree. As for the 
claim that a more accurate grasp will promote the desired transformation, the 
theologian might have two responses. First, he might ask if there is any evidence 
that this is so. Have the people with the greatest understanding of these matters 
been greatly transformed by their understanding? Second, he might wonder 
whether other means of promoting transformation might be even more useful, 
either for certain people or for most people (or perhaps even for everyone 
except highly skilled philosophers and theologians). The remarks in this 
paragraph seem to support the conclusion that division of labor based on 
different abilities and interests will limit somewhat the extent to which phi-
losophers and theologians are in communication with each other, at least if, 
and as long as, their interests are as different as I have suggested. 
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The prospects for close interest in each other's work are also diminished 
by the different doctrinal convictions out of which contemporary theologians 
like Kaufman and contemporary philosophers of religion like Stump and 
Kretzmann work. As I suggested earlier, neither finds the doctrines involved in 
much of the work of the other to be a live option. I suggested possible motivations 
for the theologian's attitude; I have not explored reasons for the philosopher's 
attitude, but perhaps it is simply that none of the theologian's reasons apply to 
her. And it may well be that she is justified in investigating what she does and 
in having little interest in the theologian's investigations, even if the theologian 
is also justified in not being interested in her work. In any event, the division is 
not absolute. There are theologians who share the doctrinal convictions of phi-
losophers like Stump and Kretzmann and there are Christian philosophers of 
religion who have doubts about the traditional doctrines and who share the 
confessional stance of theologians like Kaufman. Members of these two groups 
may help promote some mutual influence between theologians like Kaufman and 
philosophers like Stump and Kretzmann, but right now they are a minority. 
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NOTES 
1. "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Faith and Philosophy, 6/1 (January 
1989), pp. 35-46. (Numbers in parentheses in discussions of Kaufman's ideas refer to this 
work.) 
2. "Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy," Faith and Philosophy, 7/3 (July 1990), 
329-39. (Numbers in parentheses in discussions of Stump and Kretzmann's ideas refer to 
this work.) 
3. Although I express this generalization unqualifiedly, I do not intend it to apply to all 
theologians today or even to all Christian theologians. For llack sufficient acquaintance 
with the views of non-Christian theologians to offer generalizations about their positions 
or motivations. Nor do I think that the generalization is true of even all Christian 
theologians. But I suggest that it is true of at least most of those Christian theologians 
whose position Kaufman's original article represents. Unless otherwise noted, henceforth 
theologians refers to them. Also, for the sake of convenience, I will use masculine 
pronouns to refer to theologians and feminine ones to refer to philosophers, though both 
groups include both sexes. 
4. I cannot even begin to give adequate documentation for this claim. But consider the 
importance of movements in contemporary theology which take the center of Christianity 
to be ending oppression and achieving a more just order: liberation theology, black 
theology, feminist theology, and ecological theology. Consider too John Hick's judgment 
that the major religions are "centrally concerned with a radical transformation of the 
human situation," which Christians term salvatioll ("Religious Pluralism and Salvation," 
Faith and Philosophy, 5/4 [October 1988], p. 365). I suggest that Hick's judgment expresses 
78 Faith and Philosophy 
the views of many contemporary theologians, notably those whom Kaufman exemplifies. 
Such a concern has important roots in the Christian tradition (e.g., Matt 7:20-21). 
5. He uses the fonnal mode in several places: e.g., "the ultimate mystery, a mystery 
which we may (in faith) choose to call 'God'" (44); "the image/concept 'God' seems 
intended to symbolize that-whatever it might be-which brings true human fulfillment" 
(43); and several similar locutions on pp. 43-44. 
6. This too is more hinted at than explicitly developed in the article. But Kaufman speaks 
of a "sphere which we humans can (and should) largely control" (44) in contrast with 
something like the sphere of God, which humans cannot and should not try to control. 
Moreover, the confident way he uses historical findings as well as this quote suggest to 
me that he would distinguish the degree of justification we have for our judgments on 
different subjects. 
7. This distinction might also provide a basis for a reply to another inconsistency with 
which Stump and Kretzmann charge Kaufman: "claiming that we can't know that some 
moral views are of more value than others in helping us sort out major issues" (336) while 
at the same time confidently pronouncing certain things (e.g., the holocaust and environ-
mental damage) as evils. I suggest that Kaufman might claim to be more justified in 
making judgments about particular evils than in holding general theories about the nature 
of good and evil or about purported underlying causes of particular evils (e.g., the Christian 
idea of original sin or the Buddhist idea of tanha [craving]). 
8. This suggests a reply to Stump and Kretzmann's criticism of Kaufman's claim that 
we dare not claim that our concepts of God were directly revealed by God (44). They 
charge him with inconsistency, for his claim implies that he knows that God did not 
directly reveal them (336). But suppose it is true that concepts of God reflect the cultures 
of their fonnulators. Then either the concepts were chosen by their fonnulators or God 
used concepts which would fit well with the culture when God revealed various things. 
In either case we should expect to think and speak about God by means of concepts which 
fit our culture, not concepts fonnulated in different cultures. Moreover, if we are therefore 
not obliged to use the latter, the statement that we dare not claim that any of our concepts 
of God were directly revealed might be one way to resist any who would use the contrary 
claim as a basis for requiring that we use certain concepts. Once again, the focus on the 
effects of holding certain beliefs would lend additional justification to Kaufman's way of 
stating his claim, even if it is inconsistent with the claim that we know nothing about God. 
(Of course, it would not be necessary to state the claim as Kaufman has; my point is only 
that his way of stating it becomes understandable and, I think, less objectionable than 
Stump and Kretzmann find it.) 
9. This confessional approach implies that Stump and Kretzmann are not quite right in 
claiming that the relativist theologian must deny the truth-claims of adherents of other 
traditions and thus was no more tolerant than were non-relativists. For he need not unambigu-
ously deny their claims. While he must deny that they are justified in claiming to have so accurate 
an understanding of the ultimate mystery as to imply that everyone else should adopt their 
understanding, he can grant that they may well have a way of understanding that mystery which 
enables them to relate as effectively and as savingly to it as does the Christian's way. 
Whether this would be enough to satisfy them depends, of course, on how they understand 
their own claims. 
